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3. Soviet goals in Afghanistan are less clear. Construction of roads from the Soviet frontier through Herat to Kandahar and through Kanduz to Kabul, Soviet provision of a large-scale airlift for the exportation of 13,000 tons of Afghan fruits during the closure of the Pak - Afghan frontier, and Soviet trade policies all indicate a desire to draw Afghanistan into the Soviet market.

In the military field the Soviet Union is actively training Afghan officers and men in Afghanistan and the USSR. The missions in Afghanistan not only control training but also the entire maintenance of the air force and mobile units of the army. Upwards of 200 Afghan military cadets, some as young as sixteen years of age, have left for the Soviet Union for training of two to five years' duration.

In cultural affairs the Soviet Union applies considerable pressure on the Afghan Government to send students and teachers to the USSR and to accept Soviet professors in Afghanistan. Powerful radio stations in the Soviet Union beam an intensive barrage of programs in Farsi, Pashtu, Uzbek, and other Turkic dialects to Afghanistan. Through emphasis on its superior technology and respect for traditional culture, the Soviet Union seeks to establish a scale in which the Afghan can evaluate his own present condition and the ineffectual efforts made by his government on his behalf.

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To date, however, U.S. intelligence has discovered no case of Soviet political subversion and Afghanistan has no Communist Party.

If the objective of Soviet activities is maintenance of Afghan friendship toward the USSR, the U.S. has no necessary clash with it: Afghanistan must live, as it traditionally has, in the fissures of the great power blocs. U.S. fostering of active hostility toward the USSR can only serve to weaken Afghan ability to survive. However, the U.S. must seek to provide the wherewithal for Afghanistan to maintain an independent position. The key, however, is the Afghan will to survive.

4. The Afghans are a proud and sturdy nation. They are actually and historically a mosaic of ethnical, religious and linguistic groups who share the characteristics of mountainous life, are inured to hardships and are proud of a glorious past. The Hazaraks, who inhabit the central mountain region of Hindu Kush, may be descendants of the Chingis Khan's legionnaires. The Pashtus (or Pathans), who are scattered all over the country as nomads but whose main settled concentration is in the south, justly earned the respect of the British in over a century of fighting on the northwest frontier. The Uzbeks and other Turcoman groups

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the potential opposition of

The Committee is beginning to understand the importance of economic development to its survival. Its needs dictate it is slowly allowing the creation of a generation of trained men.

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most part they are encouraged to deal with their foreign "counter-
parts" but not to mingle excessively with foreigners. This restricts

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activities are limited.

✓ Yet, there are also positive elements of loyalty. There is certainly more to "Afghanistan" than a collection of peoples. The Pashtun form the main core of the officer corps and are the source of provincial officialdom. The extensive royal family, of Pashtun origin, is actively engaged in government at and in command at all levels and is closely bound together by the custom of family conferences and especially by an awareness of common interests.

6. The major divisive element is the nature of the country.

✓ Stretching across Afghanistan is the mighty wall of Hindu Kush.

In the winter most of the passes are blocked by snow. Communication between the northern towns of Mazar-i-Sharif, Pul-i-Khumri and Kunduz and the capital, Kabul, is over a 9,200 foot pass.

To travel from Kabul to Herat, 400 airline miles, one must drive far to the south to Kandahar, 1,000 miles over-all, to avoid the mountains. A deep gorge cuts the mountains between Kabul and Jalalabad but only recently has a fair motor road been built.

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Large areas of the country are virtually cut off from the capital. This is true of the southeast and the southwest as well as the bulk of the mountainous interior. Much of the country is accessible only by mules or donkeys. Other areas are reachable by jeep but at speeds at times less than six miles an hour and at terrific cost in equipment. Even the main "roads" are little more than trails: 313 miles from the capital to Kandahar requires 15 hours of hard riding and the 143 miles from Herat to Herat takes seven hours. From Kabul to Mazar-i-Sherif, 350 miles, is about 20 hours. Air traffic is frequently interrupted by bad weather over the passes through the Hindu Kush. There are no railroads. All fuel must be imported.

In these circumstances it is natural that the areas north of the Hindu Kush should be linked, economically, with the neighboring regions of the USSR, and that the south, politically divided by the Durand line, should be closely linked, culturally as well as by regular nomadic transit, with Pakistan. Iran is separated by vast deserts and China by even more vast mountainous wastes. Internally, the country is divided into hundreds of discrete valleys and areas which are virtually autarkic.

7. Afghanistan is one of the least developed nations. Statistics are, of course, little more than guesses and vary alarmingly from one source to another. An order of magnitude, however, is provided by these. The population is approximately 13 million of which one to two million are Nomads. Literacy is perhaps five per cent. Per capita GNP is about \$50. Life expectancy is probably as low as 20 years. Infant mortality may be as high as 500/1000. There are very few public services. For example, in Badakhshan Province, with a population of approximately 350,000, there is one doctor and in Herat Province, with a population of one million there are seven doctors. Malnutrition is almost universal and the diet is seriously lacking in protein. The staple is wheat bread and rice with rice regarded as a luxury. Nowhere in Afghanistan, even in the capital, is there a safe supply of water which is everywhere taken from open ditches. Spot checks by the WHO representative in the north indicates that tuberculosis affects over 50 per cent of the people and intestinal diseases are almost universal. An indication of the problems of health is given by the consideration that an antibiotic pill costs three-days wages for a labourer.

work out 12 thousand tons of grapes, pomegranates and melons. An Indian airline is to add an additional 1,000 tons. Two major effects of this were to change the direction of export from the Indian sub-continent to the Soviet Union to save the fruit producers from ruin.

9. The next five-year plan calls for an annual growth rate of almost 11%. Major emphasis will be placed on agriculture and irrigation to which approximately 350 million dollars will be devoted. Transportation and communications will take approximately 300 million dollars and industry and mining, approximately 250 million dollars and health and education, approximately 100 million dollars.

Subsequent to the development of the new five-year plan the Afghan Government has devoted increasing emphasis to the generation of foreign exchange by an increase in the volume and value of exports.

Assisted by Mr. Arthur Paul of the Asia Foundation, the Government is taking steps rapidly to increase the production of cotton. The amount which each farmer is required to plant in cotton has in the past been a loss to him because of the Government's policy of paying a very low price for raw cotton.

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For, however, the Government plans to raise the cotton price and to begin a program of incentives for the use of fertilizers. Cadres of people trained on the Helmand Valley Project are to be devoted to the cotton program. The Government hopes that through this scheme it can realize approximately \$13 million of extra annual income of which about 12 million would be in convertible foreign exchange. (This would be more than a 50% increase in the hard currency earnings from all exports in recent years.)

The reason for this policy is primarily political. The Afghans do not want to be forced to increase their dependence on the Soviet Union and/or the West in their development program. In their view, the past has demonstrated that the West lacks a sufficient concern with the future of Afghanistan to assure the Afghans of an alternative to the Soviet Union as a source of capital. Any withdrawal of Soviet assistance would cause a virtual collapse of their foreign exchange position. Therefore, the Afghans plan to devote a major share of their own efforts to increase the value of their cotton export.

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Present cotton production is about 60% of the U.S. per acre yield. So the Afghans hope by the use of fertilizers and better sowing methods to increase their yield without devoting excessive areas of land to cotton production.

Similarly, by better methods of sorting and dyeing the Afghans hope to increase the value of the karakul skin exports and to find new markets for karakul.

10. To assist in Afghan development plans the Soviet Bloc has offered to make available at very generous terms large amounts of Soviet credits. Precise figures do not seem to exist but at various times the Soviet Union has spoken in terms of as much as \$400 million. Recently, however, the figure most discussed is approximately half that amount. The October 1961 agreement is for a \$200 million over a five-year period.

The major Soviet projects are in transportation and power facilities. As mentioned above, the Soviet Union is building highways from the Soviet frontier southward by tunnel through the Salang Pass to Kabul and through Herat to Kandahar. Both of these highway projects are being actively undertaken at the present time and both involve use of Afghan labor with Soviet equipment and technicians.

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The Soviet Union is also assisting in various other projects notably in the field of energy. A Soviet Bloc mission is undertaking an oil and gas exploration and development program near Mazar-i-Sherif and a Czech team is assisting in coal production near Kanduz. Russian missions are constructing a 10,000 kw hydroelectric installation and irrigation project at Barmak near Jalalabad, a 9,000 kw hydroelectric plant at Pul-i-Bhumbi and a 60,000 kw hydroelectric facility near Kabul.

The Soviet Union has reportedly offered to take over the entire development program of Afghanistan. If this is true, the Afghan Government has wisely refused.

11. German assistance to Afghan development has a long commercial background. The Siemens Company and other German enterprises have been active in Afghanistan since long before the Second World War and German technicians are assisting in industrial projects in Kanduz, Pul-i-Bhumbi, and Gulkahar. The Germans are also developing a hydroelectrical installation and assisting in some road work. The able and cooperative German Ambassador has disposal of approximately \$50 million in credits for Afghan development.

12. The U.S. has provided a total of \$193 million in grants and loans since 1952. There is now no commitment on future U.S. expenditures. Unlike the Soviet and German programs the U.S. activities are not based, according to Afghan understanding, on an over-all commitment but develop from project to project. Some of these projects have been impressive contributions to the Afghan nation. Some have not. For our future benefit we need to make a critical evaluation of our past efforts.

13. A major U.S. commitment is the undertaking to build a road on the 318 miles from Kabul to Kandahar. When first projected, this road was estimated at \$16 million by a U.S. engineering firm. Subsequently and apparently largely for political reasons, the U.S. decided to upgrade the quality of the road and the cost is now expected to rise to over \$50 million.

As now projected the road is, by domestic U.S. standards, extravagant in the extreme. The use factor is now and will probably continue to be low. In my 15-hour drive over this road I passed four trucks and two cars. If one projects in the near term a multiple of this, say a hundred vehicles a day, the road should be planned to some order of this figure. This would put it in the category of a "farm to market road" at a domestic U.S. cost of \$10 to 20,000 a mile.

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This category of road is adequate for up to 1,000 vehicles a day with gross loads of approximately 12,000 pounds. A "farm to market" road is normally 20 feet wide, has a gravel base and a $\frac{1}{2}$ to $\frac{3}{4}$ inch bituminous-penetration surface. It is all-weather and good for any foreseeable future Afghan use. Our present plans say eventually cost is nearly \$200,000 a mile.

14. A second major U.S. commitment is construction of airports. Where the U.S. military, Air Force and Navy will handle C-119's and DC-4's. The Afghan Airways, Ariana, now uses DC-3's for domestic runs and lands these on a dirt strip at Mazari-Sherif as well as on the more elaborate airports. Except for its low ceiling and slow rate of climb the DC-3 is an ideal aircraft for Afghanistan, as the traffic pattern and freight control are rudimentary. Thus the existing airports are at least adequate for the foreseeable future.

The Kandahar airport, labeled an "international jet airport," which is said to have cost upwards of \$25 million, is a monument to poor planning. Kandahar will never be an international jet center. It is a town of 60,000 people in a pastoral and agricultural district without major attractions for tourism. Modern long-range

aircraft

aircraft do not need the port for refueling enroute from Tehran to Karachi or Delhi. Furthermore, since all POL is imported by truck across the mountains, the airport is not economic even as a refueling point.

15. Both the roads and airports provided useful guides for future U.S. policy decisions.

(c) Since the Afghan Government has not known or considered from the over-all U.S. commitment to assist in developing its economy it has sought to get the most it could in each individual project. If one is offered a car why not ask for a Rolls even if a Ford will do. The result is that the projects have been the most expensive from our point of view and not necessarily say more useful from the Afghan point of view.

If, on the other hand, we would be prepared to say, in effect -- "we intend to spend \$50 million on road construction in Afghanistan. Now let us work together to see that this money does the maximum good for the Afghan economy." -- There are strong indications that the Afghan Government would have cooperated to use funds more wisely. Since only two of six projected contracts have been let on the Kabul to the Kandahar road it may still be possible to

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salvage some of these funds. They are needed for other projects in the country and the Afghan Government realizes this.

The same is true of the airports but unfortunately the money is already spent. Our aim now should be to maximize use of the airports in ways which will be discussed below.

In our future aid efforts we should offer an over-all commitment and then critically examine each project within the over-all commitment. This approach has been successfully used by the Germans in their efforts in Afghanistan. The Germans gave an over-all commitment to Afghan development of \$50 million and within that figure have been extremely selective in the choice of projects. If they did not wish to undertake a project they simply raised their requirements for the Afghan portion of the over-all expenditure and let the Afghan Government quietly shelve the project.

(b) Roads and airports are inert and neutral. There is little to distinguish a Soviet from an American road or airport. While appreciation for American activities is not now and should not become an overriding consideration, we should

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should recognize that we create little "presence" by a strip of concrete with which we were once associated. We should seek in our future projects to use our aid funds to create organizations and cadres of people to maintain what we have helped to build and to perpetuate our method of approach. We should make no attempt to use these organizations for short-term political benefits but rather should hope that they will grow and develop within Afghan society. Examples of such organizations will be given below.

16. The Helmand Valley Authority, as the obvious pattern of the initials indicates, was begun as a major social engineering project. The Helmand Valley for over a thousand years supported flourishing civilizations but invasions, depopulation and neglect have led to the breakdown of its ancient canal system. While the area is not capable of sustaining a vast TVA-like development, it offers the only major area of potential growth of Afghanistan. Reclamation of the land and draining of the swamp areas could significantly boost Afghanistan's productivity, would allow the Afghan Government to achieve its objective of increasing its earning of foreign exchange and, if properly devised, could foster the growth of a strata of small holders which would give the country more stability.

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To date only the upper Helmand Valley has been subjected to intensive development. The project, on which the U.S. has spent more than \$100 million, has been the butt of much criticism and has experienced obvious short falls: since it was begun on inadequate studies of water and salt conditions some land has been lost while other land has been reclaimed at exorbitant cost.

Inadequate studies were made of the social conditions and agricultural training of the farmers so that certain of their acres were uselessly violated and their skills have proved inadequate to the tasks they faced. Land plots, about 15 acres each, are too small to foster the growth of a prosperous farming group and do not allow sufficient income for the purchase of fertilizers. As a result there is a tendency to allow land to lie fallow on alternate years. Water is not sufficiently controlled and the water-starved peasants naturally have used excessive amounts--"they were like alcoholics given the key to a package store." Credit facilities are non-existent and loans are obtained at rates as high as 100 %. No cooperatives were created and even such activities as 4-H clubs which were inadequately understood by the Government were banned. Land was not fully leveled or sufficiently reclaimed when turned over to the farmers.

Nor

Nor is the project self sustaining: there are no taxes or charges for water so in any government crisis - as in the closing of the border - programs in the Helmand are sharply curtailed.

Yet, for all this, the scheme is making progress and by Afghan standards is a major achievement. In my opinion we should remedy its mistakes and capitalize on its virtues rather than wasting time in bemoaning its weaknesses. Ways in which this can be done will be discussed below.

17. Various other smaller American projects take up the energies and ambitions of the rest of the American mission. In some cases these are important, useful and practical programs. A good example of this is the Darr-i-Shuf coal mine, 107 miles into the Hindu Kush mountains from Mazar-i-Sharif. In other cases our projects seem to represent merely a scattering of our shots and an excessive growth of administrative fat.

Many members of the AID mission deserve special awards for selfless and determined efforts against heavy odds to carry out their tasks. This is particularly true of the officials at the Darr-i-Shuf coal mine and the agriculture and reclamation officers in the Helmand Valley. Certain non-governmental Americans are notable for their effectiveness and are highly praised throughout

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the Afghan Government. This is especially true of the office of the Asia Foundation and the representative of the American Universities Field Staff.

However, as in Iran, there is reason to question the success of the U.S. mission. The introduction of large numbers of relatively ~~extremely~~ highly paid Americans in a small town like Kabul causes considerable irritation to Afghans and others. The high standard at which they live and a relatively low-vision performance are both widely commented upon.

In the countryside Americans have made little impact because they are rarely seen outside of Kabul. I was the first State Department officer to visit some of the areas in which I traveled and the first since May of 1961 to travel north of the Hindu Kush mountains.

Nor have we done an efficient job of capitalizing on our achievements. Even those cases in which U.S.-Afghan cooperation has been most effective have not been communicated to the Afghan public with sufficient vigor.

13. Since our aim is to preserve Afghan independence, in developing our future program we should be certain that we have correctly identified the areas of the greatest Afghan weakness and those methods of approach which will enable us to win Afghanistan's confidence.

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As I identify them the areas of greatest Afghan need are the following: transportation, energy, agricultural assistance, and the creation of cadres of trained personnel.

As the Afghan Government identifies them the priorities are much the same. However, the first priority is loyalty from those who are allowed to acquire the means of changing the internal balance of power, and the generation of sufficient foreign exchange to assure a modicum of flexibility in the next development plan.

19. Roads are mere trails throughout much of the country. It is difficult to imagine any considerable economic growth until major improvement is made in transportation. A great deal can be done locally. For example, the Governor of Kazar-i-Sharif Province turned out 20,000 men, villagers who were seeking to pay off taxes, to build a passable dirt road of 75 miles in 28 days. The men worked by hand without a grader and since they supplied their own food and shovels the road cost was practically nothing.

Roads are badly needed in many areas of the country. The use factor on these roads, however, will be relatively small and it is possible to rely upon extremely low-cost methods of road construction. Due to the severe climatic conditions and particularly the lack of rain, gravel roads do not hold up well

as the "blinder" dust is blown away in any heavy traffic. At the same time since rainfall in much of the country is less than four inches a year, dirt roads are adequate for many areas. While Afghanistan clearly does not need \$200,000 a mile super-highways it needs a great many miles of asphalt "farm to market" roads and many more miles of passable dirt roads.

What is even more lacking than the roads themselves, however, is any system of maintenance. In my 2,000 miles of driving in Afghanistan, I averaged 16 miles an hour because almost every road was an endless collection of pot-holes and unnecessary ruts and bumps. Thus, any road building program should put first priority on the creation of a highway maintenance service. This should be an extremely inexpensive organization to create as most of the maintenance could be done by hand.

A road building program would serve to open up large areas of the country particularly in the lower Helmand Valley.

As part of the Helmand development scheme, we should consider building a road from Lashkargar down the Helmand to Chahar Burjak and northward to Rad-i-Ali. This road, approximately 300 miles, is partially built at its upper end and could be paved and completed for as \$3-5 million. It would open the

entire

entire Helmand Valley to the country's market. It should not be undertaken, however, except as part of an over-all scheme for the development of the lower Helmand in such a fashion as to avoid the mistakes of the first phase.

A "farm to market" road should be planned from Hazer-i-Sherif to Herat. This would enable the cotton and the karkul of the north to be shipped to the West through Iran. At present, these would have to go by way of Kabul-Kandahar-Herat to Iran and this route could cost ca. \$25 per ton more than via the USSR.

We should undertake an improvement project on the Herat-Islam Qala - Mashed road. This would link the Iranian RR and also the proposed Bandar-i Abbas port with the Soviet-built Herat-Kandahar and the US-built Kandahar-Kabul road and provide a usable outlet for Afghan heavy goods. On the Herat-Mashed road, I passed about 75 trucks of which only a dozen of these traveling from Iran to Afghanistan were loaded. The existing road is 238 miles and needs only maintenance to be serviceable in dry weather. Should we undertake a project to upgrade the road, we should do so on a modest scale since the traffic is and probably will continue to be light. By using the existing Herat bridge, we could build a good, all-weather road for ca. \$24-5 million.

We should inform, by graphic means if possible, the Afghan Government senior officials of the effects of overloading of trucks on road surfaces. A 12,000 lb. axle load should be made the limit or our roads will not long hold up, and the equipment we have given the Afghan Government, much of which is now "side lined," will be destroyed.

At the same time it is important to recognize that in Afghanistan roads are not necessarily the best or only answer to the transportation problem.

In the Hindu Kush mountains south of Mazar-i-Sharif is the Barr-i-Saf coal mine. The road from the Mazar-i-Sharif to Barr-i-Saf is 107 miles of eight hours of hard driving. This road over which coal is now being hauled, fords a river eight times, is almost totally lacking in maintenance and contains numerous hairpin curves, one of which on the face of a cliff, 1500 feet over a river bed, is so narrow that a jeep station-wagon must stop and back up to finish the turn. There is no gas enroute so all must be hauled in jerry-cans. Some of the grades are 25 per cent.

Even if this road were to be repaired and put in good condition the energy required to lift a load of coal over the mountains into Mazar-i-Sharif, which is about 1800 feet above

sea-level

sea-level, and then back over the Hindu Kush at nearly 10,000 feet, is such as to make coal production extremely uneconomic. However, since there is a river at the mine it should be possible to convert the coal into thermo-electricity and send this directly over the mountain by high-tension lines to the three main centers of industry in Afghanistan, Mazar-i-Sherif, Pul-i-Kuhair and Kabul. The coal mine is located at the hub of these three cities.

We should also encourage the growth of air freight service.

This would bring into use the airports in which we have already put a great deal of money and would provide an almost immediate avenue to the west for Afghanistan's two major exports, fruit and kerkul.

Such a freight line could go from Mazar-i-Sherif or Kandahar to Bandar-i-Abbas or Hormuzshahr. When one considers the cost of maintenance of trucking equipment and the importation of POL, air freight may prove to be an economically competitive means of transportation.

20. Energy is in critically short supply all over the country. The whole of Afghanistan is practically denuded of timber. The only trees one sees are cultivated and guarded from the ubiquitous herds of sheep and goats. Deforestation produces serious erosion, rapid run-off of water, and forces the people to burn the animal dung excreted by their herds to warm themselves. It has also led to the rapid silting of hydroelectric storage reservoirs.

Gas and oil deposits are still in the proving stage. Russian technicians have discovered some small producers of lightweight oil (of which 54% is kerosene) and gas rated at three to four million cubic feet. The Afghan Government apparently believes that it is possessed of huge reserves. Several ministers, for example, have built new houses with oil furnaces and the new Ministry of Mines building is to be heated by oil. However, the President of the Petroleum Industries in Mazar-i-Sharif told me that this is wishful thinking from the evidence he now has.

Hydroelectric power is tapped at several places in Afghanistan but almost everywhere it faces rapid silting of its reservoirs due to the rapid rate of erosion. The German Ambassador told me that his technicians think that the new Russian project near Jalalabad faces silting of its reservoir in about eight years. The existing dam down the gorge from Kabul toward the Khyber Pass is nearly choked now. Dams at Pul-i-Khanari and Kanduz supply small amounts of power for the local textile and cement factories. Another small plant operates near Kanduz to supply the town and the combined cotton company.

Coal

Coal reserves are rapidly being depleted at the mine near Pul-i-Kharri and much will depend on the new Durr-i-Suf field which is being developed with American assistance. As mentioned above, however, the location of this mine makes it difficult to conceive of the coal being economically transported to Kabul.

21. Agricultural needs rank extremely high in priority and relatively little is now being done about them in most of the country. I visited two agricultural "extension and experimentation" farms in the Kataghan Province north of the Hindu Kush. These farms are really rose gardens for the summer leisure of officials. The Director of agricultural extension in Kataghan Province, who was trained in India, was scathing in his criticism of his own department and of the Afghan Government for its lack of effort in this field. Obviously, however, he had simply given up in his job.

An agricultural school in Saghan is projected for 1,000 students of whom 150 will board at the school. The school serves the whole northern part of Afghanistan but is actually a primary school with a bit of agricultural work tacked on and, due to the social structure of the country, will little affect the rural farming areas. The Director of the school and the Governor

both

both told us that they are hoping for some UN assistance which had been promised but which had not yet materialized.

Farmers are terribly conservative from all reports but can be taught once they see results. There was some fear even by the Afghan officials to whom I spoke in various parts of the country that someone would start a large program and fail to show results, thus making it more difficult for the modest efforts of existing programs to pay off.

After a good look around the rural areas, I found this a somewhat academic problem. Farmers are untouched by any modern notions of agriculture. They need warmth and so burn their only possible source of fertilizer. They cannot afford new seed and so use bad seed and poor cuttings. Their stick plows only scratch the soil. And they are desperately short of water. Much potentially rich land is now waste although water is available in good supply (due to the run-off of the snow-covered mountains) at various depths above 200 feet.

Farm animals are miserable. I saw cattle the size of a Mexican burro and chickens as tough as an eagle. At little cost we could make a useful contribution in this field. I believe, however, that except for occasional exceptions, we should concentrate such small-scale activities in our large-scale Helmand project.

If we were able to develop a widely accepted breed of cattle, for example, it should be associated with the US-sponsored Helmand scheme.

An exception, which could produce useful local results would be the importation of about 5,000 eggs to the Darr-i-Suf coal field. When chickens are hatched, they could be swapped for the miserable chickens of the valley. The villagers' chickens could be used to feed the coal miners while the better new stock could provide eggs which the villagers could sell to the miners. This would not only provide a considerable U.S. "impact" at small cost on the villagers and on the nomads for whom this is the main route from winter and summer grazing areas but would also provide a means of raising the productivity of the area.

Afforestation should be an extremely high priority project.

Wood for fuel is the only conceivable substitute for dung. It would be useful to consider the feasibility of introducing a tough fast-growing tree such as mesquite into the mountain and foothill area of northern Afghanistan.

Equally important is the development of a fertilizer industry. It is difficult to imagine any way in which the U.S. could more effectively reach people throughout the country than in assisting in providing them with more to eat. A fertilizer plant is included in the next five-year plan.

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Since water is in short supply throughout the country, the U.S. should consider assisting in the development of pilot projects based on windmill-run tube wells. These projects should be large enough to be fully integrated with some method of agricultural credit and cooperative being available. One such project could be put in the north near the boundary between the provinces of Khar-i-Sarif and Fatahgan. A second in the plain at Kabul ~~is~~ evident to the people of the capital.

Of overwhelming importance, however, is the potentiality of the Helmand Valley for agricultural growth. With this project the American reputation in Afghanistan is completely linked. There is an area of possible extension into the south of a third of a million acres (165,000 is in the Upper Helmand project) by drainage and leveling of land. Sufficient experience has been gained from work on the upper Helmand that many of the earlier pitfalls can be avoided. Marginal lands can be bypassed and the cadres of Afghan officials, many of whom greatly impressed me during the five days I spent with them, can work toward a more centralized and efficient control of the project.

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In the context of a strong and well-planned over-all American effort, it should be possible to insist on remedy of the various faults of the old program -- farm plot sizes should be raised to at least 20 acres; provision should be made for the establishment of cooperative societies and credit facilities; and tighter control over water including charges for water should be instituted.

We should recognize that not all of the failure of the Helmand scheme are due to Afghan inefficiency. Our own efforts have been highly erratic. For example, when one of our technicians is relieved, he may not be replaced for two years. Since April of 1961 we have had no irrigation expert in the area despite the fact that the Helmand is an irrigation project and a dairy is about to be started without the services of a veterinarian. Etc. In insisting on higher Afghan performance, we must be prepared to accept criticism ourselves and to remedy our obvious faults.

A Peace Corps mission, preferably composed of former 4-H club members, would be an extremely valuable addition to the project to push extension work.

A modest road-building program of \$3-5 million should allow the creation of a nucleus of a highway construction and maintenance department, which could eventually spread over the rest of Afghanistan,

and

and road facilities which would open to the national market potentially rich areas in which subsistence farming is now the rule. In my trip from Lashkargar through Chahar Burjak, through Nad-i-Ali to Jowain (the whole sweep of the Helmand Valley), I encountered one vehicle, a truck loaded with people. This road would be approximately 500 kilometers in length and of this amount 112 kilometers exists now in reasonable condition.

"Independent Pushtanistan" is a dead letter. I spoke to dozens of Afghans all over the country and not one of them raised the issue with me. Other Americans, who get outside the capital, have had the same experience. When the radio begins discussing Pushtanistan, it is usually turned off. This year, a number of thousands of "Kuchis" (Pashtu nomads) moved into the Helmand Valley when turned aside from Pakistan. They will suffer serious losses there as little rain has fallen and their animals are thin. Many animals are expected to die during the foaling season, but the Helmand, probably with the mixed "semi-nomadic" society of "sedentarization" familiar in the Arab areas, offers the future hope for the Pashtu nomads.

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22. A number of small items will serve to spread the impact of our larger programs throughout the country. Many of these at first glance may seem trivial in comparison with such major projects as the Helmand Valley. But a number of them offer the only feasible and efficient avenues of American activity.

A. USIS activities should give top priority to the development of an Afghan sense of confidence. The Afghan Government would doubtlessly appreciate activities which engender this spirit. For example, it should be possible to produce a film on the project to develop a coal mine at Darr-i-Suf. This is a startling effort at "boot strap" nation-building. American involvement in the project could be played in very low key and major credit given to the Afghan Government for its activities to help its people. A similar project on the Helmand Valley would pay great dividends.

A major useful activity would be the further inculcation of pride in the Afghan national past. Afghanistan is a colorful country. Its people have an intense interest in their folk tradition. Therefore, activities of this sort would be more productive to the basic American objectives in Afghanistan than abstract and little understood propaganda about the American way of life.

B. A major

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B. A major Afghan lack is protein. Since the Soviet Union has already invested much money in dam building, the U.S. should consider stocking the resulting lakes with fish. The chances are that the net effect of the good will would be toward us rather than toward the USSR at probably less than 1% of the cost.

C. Through careful sub-contracting of jobs, e.g., in auto and truck maintenance, we should gradually foster the creation of a middle class. There is a large body of men in the country who were trained by Morrison-Knudson International in auto repair and we might consider using our activities to convert them into active businessmen. We might further assist in this by providing surplus tool and blacksmith shops from Pentagon stocks.

D. Generation of local currencies will continue to be a major problem. We should not let lack of local counterpart hinder us from those projects we consider important. We could, however, expand our activities in low-bulk goods such as edible oils and protein high products. Due to shipping restrictions we should perhaps cut down on wheat importation.

E. Our powdered milk program, now run by UNICEF and CARE, is not well handled outside Kabul. In the north, the milk is sold and does not reach the children while in the Helmand, the progress has been discontinued due to lack of supplies. Where milk is available, it should be provided, in liquid form, at schools and hospitals and consumption should be on the premises.

F. Since

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in the U.S. Army, and in the U.S. Air Force. This is in the U.S. Army. Things which are selected into the army are normally put into the U.S. Army to serve out their conscription period. This Corps is used for road construction and other heavy activities. Members of the Corps are paid approximately fifty cents a month in salary and are subjected to a discipline reminiscent of the military.

It would be desirable to have nothing to do with such a group. It would be useful to explore the possibility of taking a well-group of this U.S. Corps and creating from it a disciplined, well-paid, properly-uniformed Corps of Engineer-type organization. It should be possible to experiment in this way on any of the major U.S. projects. It would be difficult for the Afghan Government to refuse to allow this experimentation in view of the Soviet prescription of the role of the military field.

23. We should work with and encourage further participation in the development of Afghanistan of non-Communist nations. The Government available some \$50 million of which a large part is not yet committed. We should develop the closest relationship with the Germans so that our efforts are complementary.

Similarly we should encourage the Italians, who are said to be interested in an aircraft mine near Chahar Burjak, and the Japanese,

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F. Since intestinal diseases are prevalent and medicines expensive, the U.S. might want to send a non-Government public health group from Johns Hopkins, Harvard or the Rockefeller Foundation to explore means by which an attack could be made on the public health problems.

G. School enrollment increased 88% during the first five-year plan but there are now less than 1 1/2 million pupils in school, of whom only about 100 each year graduate from college. Due to the lack of facilities we must seek imaginative approaches to train or retrain people for productive employment. No. (sic) U.S. project should be contemplated without major emphasis on in-service training. Furthermore, due to the sensitivity of the Afghan Government on sending Afghan nationals abroad for study, we should only rarely plan to bring students to the U.S. Rather, we should plan major emphasis on conducting training programs in Afghanistan. This is the only way in which significant numbers of the best qualified students and trainees may be reached.

H. Since the Soviet Union has pre-empted the field of military training, the U.S. can make no significant inroads in military affairs. Our efforts to date in this field have been largely unsuccessful. There is, however, one area, of a para-military nature,

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Japanese, who have sent technicians to assist in the pottery industry, to take a larger part in the development of Afghanistan.

14. Various aspects of our efforts need careful attention.

a. Our staffing pattern has been erratic and rapid change-over is a hind to the close man-to-man relationship upon which hard-won confidence depends.

b. While some members of our mission have earned the highest praise from the Afghans, we must be extremely careful to minimize the ostentation of our mission in the capital. The Russians, who travel to work in buses, at an early hour, are unfavorably compared with American chauffeur-driven personnel. If the Government pays for cars to be shipped to Afghanistan we should not also need a large fleet of cars and drivers. This aspect of Kabul life is demoralizing to the hard-working personnel in the outer areas of the country.

c. Many of the U.S. activities have gone unappreciated since the reports on them are written in English and the Afghans lack the facilities to translate these. No official consideration (at the Cabinet level) is ever given without a Farsi or Pashtu translation. Thus, a study which may have cost \$100,000 to do is ignored or buried for lack of a translation. We should provide translations of all our studies.

d.

d. A third item which could gain the U.S. a tremendous amount of good will would be the provision of Polaroid cameras for all traveling officials who, upon being entertained in the Afghan manner, could provide their hosts with mementos of the visit. Two or three Americans have done this on their own and have earned a great deal of good will by their efforts.

e. Due to the difficult road conditions, the Ambassador should be supplied with a helicopter capable of climbing over the Hindu Kush range. His Attache plane, a DC-3, will restrict him to a few major centers whereas he could make quick and efficient visits throughout the country in a helicopter.

f. We should consider the provision of a small-scale radio transmission facility for outlying posts such as the coal mine at Darr-i-Suf which now lacks communication with the outside world.

g. Good equipment for our personnel is essential. In the outlying districts our people are virtually immobilized by poor equipment. The only vehicle we should send to Afghanistan is the Jeep Station Wagon with 4-wheel drive. At the present time many of our vehicles are Corvairs which are useful only on some of the streets in the city of Kabul. Existence of many different types of vehicles makes maintenance extremely difficult and spare parts unobtainable. Furthermore, a single vehicle readily identified as American would be useful in indicating an American presence throughout the country. The Russian "Jeep" is exactly this for the Soviets.

Conclusion:

Afghanistan has the will to survive and a carefully thought-out, intelligently pursued U.S. policy can greatly increase its chance of doing so.

We should, to achieve maximum benefit from our expenditures in Afghanistan, make an over-all five-year commitment. Within that commitment, however, we should exercise a very hard-headed approach in our choice of AID projects.

We should demand that our AID funds are used with discrimination and creativity: we should undertake no construction project which does not include the creation of a cadre of people capable of maintaining it. We should concentrate our activities on major projects and then through the development of better person-to-person relationships make certain that our major activities are understood and appreciated throughout the country.

We should be extremely cautious to not overplay our hand in Afghanistan. The Afghan ability to survive depends in large part on Soviet acquiescence and a policy which frightens the Soviet Union will be self-defeating. The spectrum of profitable U.S. action is small. Our goal is not to win but to hold.

) Similarly,

Similarly, we must be careful not to embarrass the Afghans. By pushing too hard we will create Soviet counterpressures and by too close an identification with friendly Afghan officials we may undermine their effectiveness within their own government or create suspicion of their loyalties.

At the same time, however, we can capitalize on the genuine Afghan desire for independence. In my talks with a dozen provincial governors throughout the country, I found their feelings on this subject to be extremely encouraging and vigorously held.

What needs to be developed is the muscle of the Afghan economy and a feeling of self-confidence.

A piecemeal short-term approach by the U.S. will be a waste of money. If we drift as we are now doing, Afghanistan is likely to slide into the Soviet orbit almost imperceptibly over the coming decade. But if we wish to do so we can maintain this vital buffer and so protect our important investments and interests in Iran and Pakistan.